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The Decline of North American Industry
Jorge Niosi and Philippe Faucher
During the post-war period North America has not
been de-industrialising, if we define this term as an
absolute loss of industrial jobs and/or an absolute fall
in industrial output. However, it has suffered a decline
relative to the world economy as a whole, not only in
manufacturing, but also in commerce and finance.
This decline is partly due to the rising competitiveness
of Japan, Western Europe and several newly
industrialising countries (NICs), which have captured
large shares of foreign and domestic markets
previously served by American products. In the US the
decline is also due to the military effort; this is evident
both in the use of public R & D funds, and in the share
of defence expenditures in total public expenditures.
Continental Europe and Japan are much more
concerned with civilian R & D, while the US and UK
use most public funds for military research, which has
fewer spin-offs for civilian industry.
The following excerpts from two separate papers by
Jorge Niosi and Philippe Faucher document for the
US and Canada respectively the principal mani-
festations of economic decline, and briefly discuss the
response of the state to the latter.
THE DECLINE OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDUSTRY: I USA
Jorge Niosi
US Economic Decline
On the basis of the data shown in Tables I and 2 below
we can refute the thesis of an absolute industrial
decline in the US economy. Industrial employment
(and especially manufacturing employment) shows
positive changes during the post-war period (Table 1).
Using the absolute employment loss definition, the
UK has actually 'de-industrialised' during the last 25
years, losing 25 per cent of its labour force from 1961
to 1981. West Germany, France and the Netherlands
have lost some industrial jobs while Canada, the US,
Japan and Italy actually increased industrial employ-
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ment. Nor is there any absolute industrial decline in
US production, according to Table 2. Only the UK has
experienced a steady industrial depression, with 1982
production levels close to 1972 figures. The US does,
however, show slower industrial growth than other
advanced competitors apart from the United
Kingdom.
Relative industrial decline is, however, evident from
Table 3, while relative economic decline can be seen in
Table 4. In 1980 the American GDP was one third of
that of the OECD, compared with more than 50 per
cent in 1960. Slow GDP growth rates in the US
account for this relative economic decline.
Contemporary with this relative economic and
industrial decline, we also find a commercial decline
(see Tables 5, 6 and 7). It should be noted that rival
trade powers do not follow the same path: the EEC
and Canada increased their share of world exports
until the beginning of the 1960s. Only Japan steadily
increased its share of world trade throughout the
period. However, Table 6 shows that the US is the only
country in which the growth rates of exports were
regularly below the world average from 1950 to 1981.
The US share of the capitalist world's manufacturing
exports has fallen from 22.3 per cent in 1950 to 14.9 per
cent in 1981.
Financial decline is also evident from Table 8. During
the first 20 years of the post-war period, American
banks received large amounts of foreign deposits and
made corresponding loans. However, their share of
world financing rapidly diminished during the 1960s.
In 1966 British banks regained first place in terms of
foreign assets and, in 1970, in terms of foreign
liabilities. The US banks have not declined alone: the
banks of all developed countries reduced their share of
foreign assets and liabilities of deposit banks in the
capitalist world, while several banks in the Arab
countries and in the NICs increased their share
correspondingly.
Table 1
Principal industrial countries: changes in labour force, 1961-81
SAIl industries' includes resource extraction, manufacturing, public utilities and building.
Source: OECD, several issues, Labour Force Statistics, Paris
These data refute the thesis that the US has maintained
economic supremacy in the Western world. By the
beginning of the 1980s the US was only one industrial
power among others - the largest market economy,
but not a hegemonic power. The data also refute the
three-stage pattern of decline suggested by Wallerstein
[19821. In the case of the US, industrial, commercial
and financial decline have occurred simultaneously.
The argument which seeks to explain US de-
industrialisation as a result of direct investment
abroad [Bluestone and Harrison 1982] is similar to
that which explains the decline caused by the transfer
of manufacturing production abroad [Magdoff 1979].
Both hypotheses receive some confirmation from
Table 9, which shows that US corporations are doing
an increasing proportion of their industrial production
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total labour force
(thousands)'
1971 1981
average annual
change (%)
1961/71 1971/81
USA
all industries 21,564 26,092 30,190 1.9 1.5
manufacturing - 19,066 21,817 - 1.1
CANADA
all industries 1,979 2,470 3,094 2.2 2.3
manufacturing 1,452 1,766 2,120 2.1 1.8
UK
all industries 11,190 11,104 8,503 -0.7 -2.7
manufacturing 9,215 8,754 - -0.8 -
FRG
all industries 12,932 12,741 11,123 -0.1 -1.4
manufacturing - 9,835 8,601 - 1.3
ITALY
all industries 7,646 7,617 7,728 0.0 0.1
manufacturing 5,485 - 5,388
FRANCE
all industries 7,132 8,113 7,391 1.2 -0.9
manufacturing - 5,726 5,269 - -0.8
NETHERLANDS
all industries 1,666 1,670 1,486 0.0 -1.2
manufacturing 1,185 1,118 1,039 0.1 -0.7
JAPAN
all industries 13,460 18,450 19,700 3.2 0.7
manufacturing 10,110 13,830 13,850 3.2 0.0
Table 2
Principal industrial countries: industrial production (index numbers, 1967 = 100)
Source: US Department of Commerce, International Economic Indicators, Washington DC
Table 3
US share of world manufacturing value added, 1948-79 (%)
Source: Ballance, R. and S. Sinclair 1983, Collapse and Survival: industry strategies in a changing world, George Allen and Unw
London, p16
Table 4
National shares of total OECD GDP, 1960-80 (%)
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Source: OECD, several issues, National Accounts, Paris
USA France FRG Italy
Nether-
lands UK Japan Canada
average
of all
countries
1970 108 120 131 118 137 111 152 115 130
1977 138 152 152 145 176 123 190 152 158
1978 146 154 154 148 178 127 201 158 163
1979 153 161 162 158 183 132 215 167 175
1980 147 160 162 167 183 124 225 165 176
1981 151 157 160 163 179 119 228 167 175
1982 139 156 156 159 175 119 228 149 173
1960 53 5 8 6 8 4 944
1965 50 7 8 7 7 4 1,388
1970 47 10 9 7 6 4 1,927
1975 38 12 10 8 6 4 4,081
1980 34 14 11 9 7 3 7,544
1948 56.7
1953 55.3
1958 34.2
1963 37.6 29.7
1970 24.3
1975 21.3
1979 21.7
year USA Japan FRG France UK Canada total GDP OECD
($US bn)
year current prices constant prices
Table 5
Shares of total world exports by value, 1950-81 (%)
calculated on fob exports, current dollars
Source: UNCTAD, several issues, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics, Geneva
Table 6
Growth in exports, 1950-81 (%)
average annual growth in exports'
calculated on fob exports, current dollars
Source: UNCTAD, several issues, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics,
Geneva
Table 7
Shares of exports of manufactured products from capitalist countries, 1960-81 (%)
Source: UN, several issues, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, New York
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1950 1955
shares of total world exports'
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1981
USA 16.7 16.4 15.9 14.5 13.7 12.3 11.0 11.8
EEC 26.8 30.4 32.6 34.4 35.6 34.0 32.9 30.5
Japan 1.4 2.1 3.2 4.5 6.1 6.4 6.5 7.7
Canada
socialist
bloc
4.8
8.1
4.7 4.3
11.7
4.3
-
5.1
10.6
3.7
-
3.2
-
3.5
9.2
1960 1965 1970 ¡975 1980 1981
USA 22.3 19.1 16.1 15.1 13.8 14.9
EEC 55.7 55.9 49.4 49.6 48.0 43.2
Japan 6.2 8.6 9.9 11.3 11.9 14.1
Canada 4.3 4.2 5.3 3.5 3.3 3.6
1 950-60 1960-70 1970-80 1950-81
world 6.4 9.3 20.4 11.7
USA 5.1 7.8 18.2 9.7
EEC 8.5 10.1 19.4 12.4
Canada 5.3 11.8 14.9 10.6
Japan 15.9 17.5 20.8 18.1
Table 8
Foreign assets of deposit banks, 1963-82 (%)
Source: IMF, 1983, international Financial Statistics, New York, IMF
Table 9
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abroad in order to capture foreign markets. These
figures, however, have to be considered in the light of
the following remarks. US corporations have not been
alone in multinational expansion; other countries'
large firms have not only adopted the same strategy,
but the rate of increase of their overseas investment
has been faster. Not only is the American economy
itself being invaded by European, Japanese and
Canadian multinational corporations which are
carving out increasingly important niches for
themselves in the economy, but many studies show the
displacement of American goods by other countries'
exports in many foreign markets [Roemer 1975;
Baranson 19811. In short, the multinational expansion
Sources: UNCTAD, several issues, Handbook of international Trade and Development Statistics, Geneva
US Department of Commerce, several issues, Survey of Current Business, Washington DC
of US manufacturing firms seems to be only a phase in
the US decline. Multinationalisation is not afactor of
decline, but a means of slowing it down, enabling US
firms to shelter from European and Japanese
competition behind the protectionist barriers of client
countries. Nevertheless, US overseas investment is
growing more and more slowly. In 1982, for the first
time since the Second World War, it fell in absolute
terms by nearly $US6 bn. Multinationals have not
been insulated from the crisis, as Andreff [1982]
argues, nor, contrary to Balassa's predictions [1982],
has the revaluation of the dollar increased US overseas
investments.
1963 1967 1972 1977 1982
USA 26.5 36.2 7.1 10.2 18.3
Canada 10.1 3.7 3.2 2.1 1.7
Japan 8.2 6.4 3.5 2.5 4.0
France * * 7.8 8.4 6.4
FRG 9.7 4.0 6.0 6.7 3.6
Belgium 3.0 3.7 3.2 3.3 2.9
Luxembourg 1.1 0.7 8.4 5.9 4.6
Switzerland * * 13.2 8.2 7.2
UK 19.3 22.2 23.4 19.4 20.4
su6-total 77.9 76.9 75.8 66.7 69.1
industrialised countries 89.9 95.8 86.5 76.1 76.9
all countries (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
($US bn) 26.7 64.5 255.0 867.4 2267.9
Manufacturing exports and foreign sales of US firms, 1960-77
1 2
year manufacturing exports sales by foreign affiliates
of US
$US bn, current dollars
2/1
1960 12.3 23.6 1.9
1965 17.2 42.4 2.5
1970 29.1 78.3 2.7
1977 77.7 246.3 3.2
Table 10
Principal industrial countries, military expenditures 1961-80 (%)
'data for 1980
Source: OECD, 1983, Informations no 7, Paris
Other explanations of US economic decline seem to fit
the facts better. The thesis of the military burden is
strongly confirmed both by cross-national data on
military expenses as a proportion of total expenses
(Table 10), and on public financing of R & D (Table il).
In 1981 only 2.5 per cent of publicly financed R & D in
the US went into agriculture and industry, while the
equivalent figures for Japan and Canada were roughly
33 per cent. At the same time 65 per cent of public
funds in R & D went to military activities in the US, 55
per cent of British funds but only 17 per cent in Japan,
13 per cent in West Germany and 12 per cent in Italy
(see Table 11). Besides, military expenditures
represented a larger proportion of total government
expenditures in the US than in any other industrial
military expenditures as a % of total public expenditure
Source: UN, several issues, Statistical Yearbook, New York
Table 11
Principal OECD countries, public financing of R & D by sector, 1981 (%)
share of total public R & D financing
defence and space
energy, infrastructure
agriculture, industry
health, welfare
promotion of
knowledge
total
total ($US bn)
country (Table 10). Between 1961 and 1970 44 per cent
of all US federal expenses went to defence; that figure
fell to 25 per cent between 1971 and 1980 but it
remained substantially higher than in other countries.
Once again, Japan is the advanced industrial country
least burdened by military expenditures, while the US
is the most burdened.
As to labour costs, US production workers in
manufacturing received compensation substantially
higher than their European or Japanese counterparts
from 1945 to 1970. For the last 10 years (1973 to 1983)
this is no longer so; compensation grew much more
rapidly in Western Europe and Japan than in the US,
and wages are now equivalent to those in America in
most developed countries. Of course, comparative
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1961-70 1971-80
USA 44 25
UK 17 14
France 19 8
FR0 16 11
Japan 6 5
US FRG France UK Japan' Italy Canada
65.7 12.9 41.4 54.9 16.8 12.3 6.6
14.4 22.0 13.9 8.0 32,4 27.8 25.0
2.5 12.8 12.7 11.6 35.6 21.6 33.2
13.6 10.0 6.7 3.3 11.2 5.9 14.0
3.8 42.3 24.6 22.4 4.1 32.4 21.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
35.5 7.3 7.0 6.3 5.5 2.9 1.4
advantages in labour intensive goods still hold for all
NICs, against US goods.
The US Response to Economic Decline
From 1945 to 1965 a small portion of the American
economy was exposed to world competition. Since
then this portion has increased dramatically, due to
the lowered tariff barriers following the GATT
rounds, to improved international transportation and
to the growth of production and productivity in other
industrial and newly industrialised countries. From
1969 to 1980 the ratio of imports to final sales of goods
in the US rose from eight per cent to 21 per cent. The
US economy is now much more vulnerable to foreign
competitors than it was 20 years ago. Several authors
estimate that nearly 70 per cent of US manufacturing
production is now exposed to international markets
[Magaziner and Reich 1983].
This growing exposure of the US market, combined
with the improved industrial performance of its
competitors has produced increasing deficits in the US
trade balance for tangible goods. Since 1975 this trade
account has been negative. Estimates for 1983 show a
negative balance of $65.5 bn, and forecasts for 1984
put the deficit at $100 bn.
Several items of this trade balance are worth a more
careful analysis. Official statistics of US foreign
commerce divide it into five major sectors. The
automobile trade, one of the most important, was
largely positive from 1945 to 1970, then became
increasingly negative, in spite of the 'voluntary'
restrictions on Japanese car exports to the US. In this
key industry, responsible for 15 per cent of American
jobs, the US share of world production fell from 79 per
cent to 19 per cent between 1946 and 1982; meanwhile,
the Japanese share increased from zero to 27 per cent;
West Germany and France also took growing shares
of the market. Imported cars now serve 30 per cent of
the US market, while US production fell from a peak
of 11.1 mn cars and trucks in 1965 to 6.9 mn in 1982.
The slight increase in 1983 production is largely
explained by the impact of protectionist measures
imposed by the American Government against
Japanese imports since 1981.
The US trade deficit is also growing in two other major
categories, namely intermediary and consumer
industrial goods, while surpluses are increasing in
agricultural products and capital goods. In the latter
division, however, the crucial machine-tools trade has
shown an increasing deficit since 1976, due to
European and Japanese competitors capturing
foreign and domestic markets as well.
To reduce the devastating effects of the decline in US
competitiveness, the federal government has adopted
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several measures. These do not constitute a
comprehensive 'industrial policy', but they are a
systematic and coherent set of responses. They can be
summarised in three points: non-tariff protectionism,
bail-outs and labour cost reductions.
As to protectionism, tariffs have fallen steadily during
the post-war period, mainly through the GATT
rounds. However the US Government has developed
another kind of protectionism, as effective as the first
one, namely non-tariff barriers. One of the main forms
of this new protectionism is 'voluntary' restrictions on
foreign exports, by which foreign countries have
accepted to limit or reduce their exports to the US
under the threat of an increased US tariff or other
unilateral measure. For example, in 1962 the US
signed a multilateral agreement limiting the imports of
cotton textiles; in 1974 the Multi-Fiber Agreement
Regarding International Trade in Textiles included 18
bilateral agreements regulating US imports of a
variety of textiles and apparel. Japan was the first
country to be restricted by these agreements, but soon
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Brazil were
also affected. In 1977 a similar agreement was imposed
upon Japan, restricting Japanese exports of colour TV
sets to the US; this agreement was extended to South
Korea in 1978. Meanwhile, since 1969, several
agreements for 'voluntary' restrictions on steel exports
have been signed with a number of industrial
countries, and in 1981 Japanhad to accept export
quotas on its car exports to the US. Therefore, these
non-tariff agreements now cover several major
industries including textiles, apparel, shoes, steel,
automobiles, and colour TV receivers. The number of
protected industries grows continuously, with machine-
tools likely to be the next one. Together with Italy the
US is the most protectionist of the seven largest
industrial countries: in both cases 34 per cent of
imports are restricted by non-tariff barriers. As for
bail-outs, that of Chrysler in 1981 through the federal
government underwriting $1.2 bn in bank loans is well
known, but the tax reductions accorded to the steel
industry in 1982 are at least as important. Finally,
since the beginning of the l970s the US government
and large corporations have been looking for wage
freezes, the abandonment of wage indexation clauses,
productivity gains and cuts in non-wage costs. As a
result of this combined attack, labour costs in the US
have grown at a slower pace than in other industrial
countries. Labour costs are no longer an important
factor in the American economic decline.
But these different measures have not arrested the
industrial decline in the US. They have probably
slackened its pace, but they have also contributed to
reducing productivity gains and accelerating the loss
of foreign markets for US industrial goods.
In the near future two main alternatives seem possible.
The first is the continuation of present trends and
policies: economic decline and increasing non-tariff
protection, with bail-out operations intended to save a
large firm or a specific industry from bankruptcy. This
is what I call the 'British' option, adopted at the
beginning of this century in the UK and its Empire.
This path can slow down economic decline without
completely stopping it or reversing the long-term
trend. In this case the US would become a large
exporter of agricultural products and might retain a
technological lead in some capital goods industries.
The second option is that of an active industrial policy
to support sunrise industries, favour the retraining of
workers in declining industries, push innovation and
develop scientific and technical education. In other
words the adoption of the 'Japanese' option, based
upon the founding of a dynamic capitalism, passing
from one industry to another under the guidance of an
interventionist state. If the first option is that of the
Republicans, the second is the Democratic one. In
fact, the Democratic Party has made many industrial
policy propositions, and it is not easy to say which one
has most chance of being adopted. All of them,
however, include a certain amount of protectionism
and a more selective interventionist state than the
Republican option.
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The Decline of North American Industry: II Canada
Philippe Faucher
Canadian Industrial Decline
Unlike Great Britain, which is experiencing a real
process of de-industrialisation, the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to GDP has declined only
slightly in Canada, as it has in most OECD countries.
However, since the Canadian economy has been
growing for the past 10 years at a rate inferior to that
of most European nations, Canada's industrial
production index of 167 in 1981 (1967 = 100) was
significantly below the mean index of major industrial
countries (175 in 1981). The data also show that
Canada was hard hit by the most recent recession,
during which industrial production declined by almost
Il per cent in 1982.
Industrial decline is not a recent phenomenon in
Canada. Manufacturing ceased to be the major
activity leading Canada's economic growth in 1974.
This fact appears very clearly when the growth rate of
GDP is compared to that of industrial production.
This trend, which appears when looking at inter-
national comparisons, is confirmed in a much more
worrisome manner when we look at the national data
on productivity, employment and trade.
Declines in productivity, which were unknown in the
1960s, occurred four times in the 1970s. The average
growth in output per person employed in Canada
between 1973 and 1980 was marginally negative (-0.2
per cent), as compared with positive rates in West
Germany (+2.9 per cent), Italy (+2.1 per cent) and
Japan (+4.1 per cent). A more accurate measure of
productivity is the average growth in output per
person-hour worked. For the latter, the average
annual rate in Canadian manufacturing between 1975-
82 was only one per cent.
Employment is certainly a major variable in
evaluating the scale of industrial decline. Although
total employment in Canada has increased significantly
since 1970 (+34 per cent until 1982) absolute
employment in the manufacturing sector has
JDS Bulletin. 1985, vol 6 no2, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
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remained stable and is now responsible for a lesser
share (-4 per cent) of total employment. The sector
most affected by the decline in employment is the
durable goods industry. The employment index for the
latter, that had reached 149 in 1974(1961 = 100), was
down to 122 in 1982, the fall taking place essentially
during the 1981 recession.
The steady increase in unemployment should also be
mentioned. The data show that not only has
unemployment risen absolutely, but that it has been
increasing faster than the economically active
population. The unemployment rate which in the 60s
was around five per cent, reached six per cent in the
1970s, passed the eight per cent mark in the late 1970s,
and has been well above 10 per cent since 1982. This
increase indicates that an increasing proportion of
those willing to work cannot find employment. Even
allowing for the growing number of those looking for
work, we are faced with an absolute decline in the
availability of jobs in the manufacturing sector.
Though Canadian trade should receive much
attention, we have space to look at only two
dimensions of this complex issue. On a global scale,
Canada was responsible in 1970 for six per cent of
world trade; 10 years later we were down to 3.7 per cent.
Even taking into account exchange rate differences
and fluctuations in prices, this is a very sharp drop.
Canada now depends on trade for more than 29 per
cent of its GDP, which is much higher than most
developed countries with the exception of the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Given the
instability of foreign markets and the considerable
fluctuation of currency rates, and because two thirds
of Canadian trade is with the United States (25 per cent
of which is intra-firm trade), Canada is today much
more dependent than in the past on cyclical changes in
the American economy and on fiscal and monetary
policy decided upon in Washington.
The composition of Canadian exports should
certainly be of major concern. Of the goods exported,
only 32 per cent are finished goods, of which
automobiles represent in most years 20 per cent. There
is a positive trade balance for manufactured wood
products, pulp and paper, metals and petroleum, all of
which are in the early stages of transformation, with
little value added The final product trade balance
alone is responsible for a huge deficit. The Economic
Council of Canada claims that this is not a cause for
concern since our export/import ratio for final
products has increased significantly over the years:
from 30 per cent in the mid-1960s to between 50 and
60 per cent from 1968 until now. However, it must be
noted that this ratio reached an all-time high of
64.4 per cent in 1970 and has been declining since then,
while the overall trade deficit has reached enormous
proportions. In 1964, when the ratio was still 30 per
cent, the trade deficit amounted to $2.6 bn; in 1981 a
55 per cent ratio corresponded to a $21 bn deficit.
There is little cause for complacency in this rising
ratio.
A complete picture of industrial decline would require
an examination of R & D expenditures, regional
development and the evolution of specific sectors, the
so-called sunset and sunrise industries, However, it is
sufficient to note that each would confirm our analysis
of weaknesses and inadequacies in the Canadian
industrial sector.
Canadian Industrial Adjustment Policies
Since World War II, and more systematically for the
past 25 years, the Canadian Government (and the
Provincial governments as well) have been involved in
actively supporting production in manufacturing
through different instruments such as tariffs,
subsidies, loans and fiscal incentives. We shall briefly
look at their evolution, and at the orientation taken by
these policy instruments.
It is a well known fact that tariffs have declined
significantly over the past 25 years, while the volume
of duty-free imports has climbed, now reaching 70 per
cent of the total value of imports (45.8 per cent in 1979
for manufactured goods). It is frequently mentioned
that quotas and voluntary export restrictions are
actually offsetting the decline in tariffs. This is
certainly not true for Canada. Among the thousands
of products that are currently shipped into Canada,
import agreements and quotas are applied only to
textiles (21 products) and clothing (17 products) and
more recently to passenger cars from Japan. Studies
have shown that the only impact of these measures,
which are costly to the consumer and have a damaging
effect on the structure of the industries concerned, has
been to slow down temporarily the penetration of
Canada's domestic market by foreign products.
Therefore, it appears that for restructuring purposes,
trade policy is a weak instrument, particularly since
national control is limited by the international
procedures under which tariffs are negotiated.
In financial terms, fiscal incentives are the most
important instrument of government intervention
towards manufacturing industries. From 1973 to 1979
we note a regular increase in fiscal incentives in
relation to value added. These incentives are designed
mainly to stimulate investment and encourage
expenditures in R & D.
By looking at the real imposition rates of different
categories of firms we can measure the sectoral impact
of fiscal incentives. It appears that these favour those
industries which are capital-intensive (primary metals,
non-ferrous metals, petroleum and coal) against
labour-intensive industries (shoes, textiles). This
means that big firms, which are more common in the
capital intensive industries and which are able to tailor
their investments in order to maximise their use of all
available incentives, receive the most benefits. At the
other end of the scale, small firms can take advantage
of special tax credits and lower interest rate
programmes specially created for them.
This situation is not unique to Canada and has been
documented for other countries such as the United
States and Britain. Fiscal incentives are essentially
targeted towards expanding sectors, since to claim a
tax credit or a deduction a business has to declare a
profit and engage in capital investment. This is
particularly unsuitable for declining industries.
Therefore it appears once again that the way the policy
has been designed limits the structural impact of fiscal
incentives.
Direct financial assistance includes subsidies, loans
and loan guarantees. Until 1967 almost 70 per cent of
direct subsidies were applied to shipbuilding and
defence related industries (mostly aeronautics).
Between 1965 and 1970, numerous programmes were
created and regional development became a major
concern of the federal government. Overall financial
assistance to industry reached a peak of $270 mn in
1971 and (in 1971 constant dollars) has decreased in
the following decade, catching up to its previous level
only in the past two years. As industrial decline
became more apparent, government intervention
through assistance actually diminished. There are two
causes for the latter. First, major programmes were
cut because of government budgetary constraints.
Second, since most programmes are linked to
investment, the diminution of transfers reflects the
overall slowdown of private investment in manu-
facturing. Direct financial aid is the policy instrument
that can be most effectively manipulated in a
discriminatory fashion, but it has seldom been used in
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this way. For example, financial support is only
exceptionally available to businesses that are
experiencing real financial and structural difficulties.
Our survey of past practices makes us believe that the
design of the policy instruments makes them by and
large inadequate to address efficiently the problem of
Canadian industrial decline. In summary our
arguments are as follows:
- most programmes were created in a period of
rapid economic growth to stimulate production. The
government's intervention has declined while the rate
of growth of production has collapsed. Only recently
has there been a change in policy orientation (as
indicated by the creation of the Canadian Industrial
Renewal Board);
- programmes are not designed to cope with the
structural problems of declining industries;
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- government intervention has always stopped
short of interfering with the market (which is by
definition what a structural policy should do).
Programmes are exclusively created to remedy so-
called market imperfections (credit gaps, externalities);
- until very recently policy instruments were not
applied in an integrated fashion, and no conditions
were imposed on the firms to qualify for public
funding;
- finally, as a general rule, there is only limited help
available to stimulate employment or to reduce the
cost to labour of industrial decline. Employment is
still considered a function of investment. It is believed
that to encourage investment is to indirectly promote
employment. But today, for a firm to invest in order to
modernise its productive process may also mean that it
will diminish its work force. The social security net is
supposed to take care of the needs of the unemployed.
